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INTEREST RATE POLICY, INFLATION AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH
A Policy Evaluation of Indonesia, 1969-1997
Iswardono Sardjono Permono
According to Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973), the most important
element of economic development is financial liberalization. This action
will eliminate the distortion, as what the government of Indonesia did on
June 1, 1983 through deregulation of banking. The government eliminated
the ceiling of credit and gave a full authority to each bank to determine their
interest rates.
This study looks up to Fry (1995) model to test McKinnon-Shaw
hypothesis. The models were regressed with dummy variable. This effort
will give illustration or conclusion of the structural change, that happened
specifically caused by environmental or policy changes.
Generally, insignificant in the relationship between interest rates in
national saving and investment in Indonesia could be caused by financial
mechanisms those very long and complex channels. That is why real interest
rates could not give effect to national saving directly. Export, especially
from oil and gas and foreign debt were growth-stimulating factors. Mean-
while, money supply, which supported by tight money policy and balance
budget policy caused Indonesian inflation along those periods.
The periodically analysis shows that deregulation of June
1983(PAKJUN) were success to mobilize public fund, encourage invest-
ment on real sector, and increase the economic growth, but failed to control
the inflation rate. The implementation of October 1988 deregulation
(PAKTO) had flourished the establishment of new banks and created good
competition among them. The competition had no longer on interest rate.
Therefore, it can be said also the easy requirements of establishing banks
become contra productive for PAKJUN policy, which had laid to the market
mechanism.
Basically, either PAKJUN or PAKTO was not policies in which
urgently implemented in Indonesia. Those financial deregulations were not
supported by the existence of deregulation on real sectors, so that the
financial deregulations were not effective to achieve their goals.
Keywords: banking deregulation; econometrics; financial liberalization; financial reform;
interest rate policy; monetary policy; PAKJUN, PAKTO
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Introduction
In many developing countries, the
governments normally restrict the on-go-
ing interest rates for both credits and de-
posit accounts. The government of Indo-
nesia also did it before June 1, 1983. This
limitation gives negative real interest rates,
after it is subtracted by the rate of inflation.
This is due to the nominal interests imple-
mented by the government is lower than
the rate of inflation. So the rates which are
drawn by subtracting interest with nomi-
nal interest rates will be negative. Interest
rate limitation tends to distort productive
resources allocation, through accumulated
capital decrease and also allocation of
capital at any level of savings. Many econo-
mists, such as Shaw (1973) and McKinnon
(1973) had stated that the distortion due to
financial repression in developing coun-
tries is more important than other policies,
such as trading limitation.
The above economists also stated that
the most important factor in economic
sector is financial liberalization. This ac-
tion will eliminate the distortion, as what
the government of Indonesia did on June
1, 1983 through the deregulation of bank-
ing. The government eliminated the ceil-
ing of credit and gave a full authority to
each bank to determine their interest rates.
This regulation was meant to eliminate
and or to loosen any rules, which made,
they believed, the distortion emerge. The
term deregulation was meant to substitute
liberalization. The action was aimed at
increasing interest rates and/or to decrease
rate of inflation. Although many econo-
mists agreed that financial reformation
program which the key element is interest
rate would benefit the developing coun-
tries, other economists questioned that
policy. Vogel (1979), Galbis (1981),
McKinnon (1981, 1982), and others had
tested on the problems that might emerge
if the program is done in the developing
countries. Since each developing country
has its own characteristics, it seems im-
possible to generalize from one country to
another. Galbis (1981) said that the suc-
cess of financial reformation program, in
any names (deregulation or liberalization)
depends on the followings:
(1) The government should follow the
basic principles of market forces,
(2) The structure of financial market and
its size are big enough to support an
effective competition,
(3) The freedom of joining and removing
themselves.
If all the above conditions or one of
them did not exist, free interest rates would
potentially cause market instability, in-
crease in oligopoly power, and stimulate a
lower deposit account situation. In this
case interest rate was the main subject
(key variable) as mentioned by Gonzalez-
Vega (1981) that interest rates were a
relative important price in market; interest
rates determined and guided prices of other
goods; and interest rates had commonly
been known as the cause of market distor-
tion.
This research is carried out to see the
problems that might occur in Indonesia
from 1983, when deregulation of banking
was implemented, until 1997, before the
economic crisis in Indonesia. The prob-
lem might be worse, if there had not been
any reformations done by the government
of Indonesia. This was because there would
be no sufficient regulations for the suc-
cessful reformation.
Objective of Research
This research attempts to know the
influence of controlled interest rates by the
government towards price and economic
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growth, and also the influences of freed
interest rates to the same variable and
finally try to test whether the financial
deregulation is worthwhile to control in-
flation and to push economic growth, rather
than hider it and lead to inflation.
Specifically, this research aims to
know if there is a positive relationship
between interests controlled by the gov-
ernment and inflation rate. In other words
lower interest rates will bring lower infla-
tion, and vice versa. Through this research
it will be seen whether there is a relation-
ship between interests and economic
growth. Lower interest rate will increase
economic growth through investments.
There is a negative relationship between
interests and investment demands in one
hand, a positive relationship between in-
vestments and economic growth on the
other hand. It means that lower interest
rates will increase the demand of inflation,
due to the fact that interest rate is a factor
of investment cost. The multiple increases
in investment will increase economic
growth. The process will be just on oppo-
site; higher interest rate means decrease in
investment demand that will lead to de-
creasing economic growth. Financial lib-
eralization is expected to lower interest
rates, followed by inflation and increasing
economic growth.
Theoretical Framework
Theoretical Model
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973)
Model. The main intellectual basis for
financial sector analysis and policy advice
over the past 30 years lies on the work of
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973).
McKinnon and Shaw analyze developing
economies that are financially repressed.
Figure 1. Saving and Investment under Interest Rate Ceilings
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Their main argument is that financial re-
pression –indiscriminate “distortions of
financial price including interest rates and
foreign exchange rates”- reduces “the real
interest rate of growth and the real size of
financial system relative to non-financial
magnitudes”. In all cases this strategy has
stopped or retarded the development pro-
cess” (Shaw 1973). The solution is to
remove these distortions imposed by gov-
ernments in developing countries.
The essential common elements of
the McKinnon-Shaw in money model, in
which financial institutions as intermedi-
ary between savers and investor, are illus-
trated in Figure 1.
Saving Sg0 at a rate of economic
growth g0 is positive function of the real
rate of interest (McKinnon 1973, and Shaw
1973). The line FF represents financial
repression, taken here to consist of an
administratively fixed nominal interest rate
that holds the real rate r below its equilib-
rium level. Actual investment is limited to
I0, the amount of saving forthcoming at the
real interest rate r0.
One reason why saving may fall when
inflation accelerates or the nominal inter-
est is lowered, can be analyzed by consid-
ering nondepreciating assets in fixed sup-
ply. With higher real land and no change in
real incomes, the household sector’s
wealth/income ratio rises. All saving theo-
ries based on intertemporal utility maxi-
mization show that greater wealth raises
consumption in present and the future. It
therefore includes a decline in saving out
of current income (Fry and William 1984).
If the interest rate ceiling applied
only to savers’ interest rates (only to de-
posit but not to loan rates of interest), the
investor/borrower would face an interest
rate of r3, the rate that clears the market
with the constrained supply of saving I0
(see Figure 1). The spread r3-r0 would be
spent by a regulated yet a competitive
banking system, on non-price competition
(advertising and opening new bank
branches). These non-price services, how-
ever, may not be valued at par with interest
payment; real money demand invariably
declines with a decrease in the explicit real
deposit rate of interest.
Interest rate ceiling distorts the
economy in four ways. First, low interest
rates can produce a bias, in terms of cur-
rent consumption and against future con-
sumption. Therefore, they may reduce sav-
ing below social minimum level. Second,
potential lenders may engage in relatively
low-yielding direct investment instead of
lending by way of depositing money in
banks. Third, bank borrowers who are able
to obtain all the funds they want at low
loan rates will choose relatively capital-
intensive projects. Fourth, groups of po-
tential borrowers consist of entrepreneurs
with low-yielding projects would not want
to borrow at higher market-clearing inter-
est rate. To the extend that banks’ selec-
tion process contains an element of ran-
domness, some investment projects that
are financed will have yields below the
threshold, that would be self-imposed with
market-clearing interest rates.
The policy prescription for the finan-
cially repressed economy, examined by
McKinnon and Shaw, is to raise institu-
tional interest rates or to reduce the rate of
inflation. Abolishing interest rate ceiling
altogether produces the optimal result of
maximizing investment and rising still
further investment’s average efficiency.
This is show in Figure 1 by the equilibrium
I2, r2, and the higher rate of economic
growth g2.
Galbis Model (1977). This model
was known as a two-sector model in capi-
tal usage in a separated economy. It means
that there is a dualism in the usage of
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capital. In this model there were high equi-
librium real interest rates that support
growth although total amount of savings
were not influenced by interest rate incen-
tives. It occurred even in high interest
rates, distribution will be better since bet-
ter quality of capital will support the in-
crease of capital productivity. Therefore,
previous higher capital used can be mini-
mized so that the rest can be allocated in
other sectors. In other words, this model
showed that efficiency in capital use would
support the economic growth and restore
income distribution.
Galbis’ analysis can be simplified by
zero-cost; a competitive banking faces
deposit account interest rate but not effec-
tive credit interest rate. In this case deposit
account interest rate should always be
bellow equilibrium. Higher real deposit
account interest rates probably restore av-
erage investment efficiency through fi-
nancial institution, not only among sector
but also within the sectors.
Gonzales-Vega (1980). The model
tested the influence of interest limitation
to socially optimum allocation of credit.
This kind of credit was defined as alloca-
tion, which will maximize net income in
aggregate for every economy participant,
including producers as well as financial
intermediaries. This micro economy model
described social cost in relation to unified
interests and interest rate limitation in the
market. It suggested to achieve an opti-
mum mechanism for income distribution
constitutes a loan cum-lump-sum. It im-
plied that unified interests would emerge
social cost or it will need a plot of credit.
This Gonzales-Vega model worked
under four assumptions:
(1) Two producers, bigger and smaller
ones, where their profits are influ-
enced by their productivity,
(2) Bigger producers are more superior
then smaller ones, especially on re-
sources ownership,
(3) Marginal cost of loan for bigger pro-
ducers is lower then that to smaller
ones,
(4) The requirement for socially optimum
allocation of credit are that each pro-
ducer will get credit if marginal cost
upon loan is equal the value of mar-
ginal product upon input variable
bought with the loan, which math-
ematically can be formulated as fol-
lows:
MC*k = VMP*k, for bigger produc-
ers buying input K,
MC**k= VMP**k,for smaller produc-
ers buying input K.
Krugman Model (1978). Krugman
model was based on Fisher model, which
was known as two period time model. The
difference was in time for income alloca-
tion. According to Fisher if profit is spend
out at the moment; consequently there is
no more profit in the future; or if it con-
sumes nothing so that all profit can be
gained in the future. This model empha-
sized on the credit market –debtor in one
hand and creditor on the other. In this case
debtors were the one who spend their
profit totally for today consumption (there
is nothing to save); creditors were the ones
who have got bank accounts for future
plans and being lent in turn. In the begin-
ning, the model considered every party
was identical. Each party was as both
consumer and producer for now and future
plan so that transformation of consump-
tion from now to future plans occurs. It
also means that there was certain amount
of money to be saved. Limitation in inter-
ests was discussed with regard to influ-
ence on wealth, efficient, and growth. The
interesting description in this model was
that when the interest rates were under the
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government’s control/supervision in equi-
librium there was a dualism in financial
market where some loans with lower inter-
est rates and some other get higher interest
rates.
Lee Model (1980). Limitation on
nominal interests, such as in the USA and
other industrial countries that limits the
interest rate of deposit accounts, had
brought disturbance in financial interme-
diaries, especially when inflation rate and
interest in the market increase. Therefore,
limitation in developing countries created
stable portfolio, in the sense that there is a
shift in asset possession from financial
asset to physical assets.  In the single bank
Lee considered that the benefit of mo-
nopoly is paid as transfer payments. One
of the impacts on bank accounts as real
interest rates decreased, due to increase of
inflation rates, was described as a case
where supplies are the same as land. The
price of a piece of land was expected to
increase, as inflation did with the same
amount at least. When real saving interest
rate decreased, land asset becomes more
interesting than deposit account. There-
fore, when the real interest rate decreases
many families withdraw their savings or
deposit accounts and spend them on land.
Consequently, the increase in price of land
is faster than the rate of inflation.
Gurley and Shaw (1960) had left in-
tellectual heritage with modern approach
for financial reformation and it had been
upgraded and developed by McKinnon
(1973) and Shaw (1973), especially in
developing countries. They both argued
that financial repression by combining
between tax within monitoring interest
rate and government’s invasion in credit
allocation processes had led to decreasing
financial systems as well as saving effi-
ciency. This argument assumed that sud-
den and overall financial liberalization
would increase system of financial and
efficiency. McKinnon (1988) suggested
that financial reformation should be done
gradually. Whereas Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) stated that even a free-market sys-
tem with no credit allotment, a rapid and
completed government role dismantle in
making credit allocation is something op-
timal. Experiences in Latin America sug-
gested that financial reformation in any
form should be postponed until real sec-
tors adjusted themselves. There is a kind
of consensus that gradual financial liberal-
ization is preferred.
Cho and Khatkhate (1989),
McKinnon (1988), and Villanueva and
Mirakhor (1990) mentioned the impor-
tance of liberalization where macro stabil-
ity and enough control from banks are the
two requirements of successful financial
reformation. Calvo (1988) and Rodrik
(1989) used credibility to support a narrow
outlook upon this adjustment program
where they let financial liberalization in
the last to adjust. Other sectors came first
before financial.
Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989) even
doubted on the benefits of that kind of
liberalization except leading to macro eco-
nomic stability to countries that hold fi-
nancial repression because people think
that tax is burdensome. Dornbusch and
Reynoso cited John Stuart Mill that finan-
cial sectors and factors will be important
when stability becomes a dominant power
upon economy. This sentiment seems to
be extreme to old Keynesian, although it is
not Keynes itself. They only see that the
so-called money is only a veil.
Gertler and Rose (1994) said that
financial liberalization especially on bank-
ing failed to reach the goals for three
reasons, namely:
(1) Accompanying the rise in loan rate
was a rise in the required external final
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premium for a substantial class bor-
rower.
(2) Timing.
(3) The failure in the most cases to ad-
equately coordinate liberalization with
the design of the financial safety net.
To avoid bigger loss due to any liber-
alization or deregulation, especially on
financial, the government should pay at-
tention to the timing and coordinate the
safety net of financial system.
Empirical Model
Fry Model (1980). Fry model was
explicitly the results of empirical experi-
ments. The components had been taken in
his paper since 1977. This model quantita-
tively presented to estimate costs as the
results of financial repression in the devel-
oping countries. The model follows
McKinnon, considering the influence of
the real interest rates for deposit account
toward money demand and credit offered,
as well as the relation between two of them
and investment, capital usage capacity and
growth. In interest imbalance situation,
due to financial repression, the decrease in
real interest rate of deposit account will
reduce the demand of real money and
credit supply. This situation would de-
crease demand of both working and capi-
tal. The use of existing capital decreased
as well. Finally, the economy would also
decrease. The estimation of the samples
taken from some developing countries
show that the cost of people paid due to
financial repression decrease growth by 5
percent for each per cent of real interest
rate changes. This was due to lower rec-
ommended interest rate compared to the
market equilibrium.
Fry Model is described as follows:
S
n
 = a
o 
+ a1g + a2Y + a3(d-i*) +
a4 SF / y + a5 Sn  / yt-1 (1)
I / y =  S
n  
/ y + St  / y (2)
g = b1 I / y + bI (d-i*) (3)
Equation (1)-(3) give after substituting g-
n+yt-1 for each Y.
g = [a
o
b1 - a2b1n + a2b1Yt-1 +
(a3b1 + b2)(d-i*) +
b1(1 + a4 SF/y) +
a5b1 (Sn/y t-1) ] / 1- a1b1 - a2b1 (4)
Short-term impacts (d-1*) at g in equa-
tion 4 are:
Whereas long term impacts are:
Notes:
Sn/y = Gross National Saving ration at
present prices at GNP
I/Y = Gross investment ratio at present
prices GNP
g = real GNP growth in proportion
y = logarithm of real income
SF/Y = Foreign Saving – GNP ratio
d = nominal interests at 12 month
deposit account
b = expected result at government’s
obligation (nominal)
i* = expected inflation rate
Research Hypothesis
Due to the objectives of this research
that shortly tries to find answers about
economic situation in Indonesia post de-
∆g =                          ∆(d-1*) (5)
a3b1 + b2
(1 - a1b1 - a2b2 )
∆g =                              ∆(d-1*) (6)
[(a3b1 / C1 - a5 ) + b2]
(1 - a1b1 - a2b2)
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regulation; the tentative answers are as
follows:
(1) There is a positive relation between
real interest and economic growth
(2) There is a negative relation between
real interest and inflation
(3) There is an inverted U curve relation-
ship between interest rate and eco-
nomic growth.
(4) Inflation rate is significantly and nega-
tively affected by real interest rate.
Research Methods
This study tries to make a policy
evaluation toward interest rates policy that
was made by the Indonesian government.
For that, this study makes division of his-
tory into periods, based on government
policy to each period. First, Pre-Deregula-
tion covers the period Pelita I, 1969 until
June 1983. In this period, nominal interest
rates and the rate of credit ceiling are
defined by the government. Second, cov-
ers the period 1983 reform until before
1988 reform. In this period was marked by
abolitions of credit ceiling system and
interest rates that had been used to control
the monetary system directly.  Third, cov-
ers the period since 1988 reform until
1997, before the economic crisis. After the
second period, it was easy to build a bank,
even with non-professional banking re-
sources. That is why there was unhealthy
competition in the commercial banking
industry.
Data
The data used in this study is second-
ary data that has been published. This
study covers the period 1969 to 1997. The
data is taken from various references such
as; The International Financial Statistic
(IFS) Yearbook (various years of publica-
tion) and CD-ROM 2000 edition, The
World Development Indicator (WDI)
(various years of publication) and CD-
ROM 1995 edition and some other rel-
evant references.
Model Used in the Research
A problem rose in McKinnon and
Shaw’s thesis, as it was shown by Galbis,
considering three positive relationships
between investment ration and real inter-
est rates:
(1) The specification of the model done
by Kapur (1978) leads to a conclu-
sion, which is reverse to the model
proposed by McKinnon and Shaw.
(2) Some writers also doubt McKinnon
and Shaw’s thesis in relation to its
validity for the underdeveloped
economy, which still needs self-sup-
port in finance. In this case, impact of
financial repression on the investment
might be very small in quantity.
(3) The empirical failure in the test of
McKinnon and Shaw’s thesis might
be due to speculative asset factor and
inflation in the definition of invest-
ment. It may also cause by structural
gap factors (lag) related to the rela-
tionship between investment and real
interest as suggested by McKinnon.
Considering that the focus of this
research is to find out the influence of
interest on macro economic variable, es-
pecially economic growth and inflation
rate in Indonesia, the behavior model can
be formulated as follows:
Saving Function:
SNYt = α 0 + α 1YGt + α 2 RDt +
α
 3SNYt-1 + α4DUM1 +
α5DUM2 + εt (7)
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Investment Function:
IYt = β0 + β1YGt + β2RWt +
β3IYt-1 + β4DCPYt +
β5DUM1 +
β6DUM2 + ξt (8)
Growth Function:
YGt = χ0 + χ1RDt + χ2XKGt +
χ3SFYt + χ4DUM1 +
χ5DUM2 +ςt (9)
Inflation Function:
INFt = δ0 + δ1MNGt + δ2YGt +
δ3RDt + δ4DUM1 +
δ5DUM2 + υt (10)
where:
SNY = national saving/GNP ratio —in
percent,
YG = rate of GNP growth —in per-
cent,
RD = real deposit rate of interest rate
(12-month deposit minus infla-
tion) —in percent,
IY = national investment/GNP ratio
—in percent,
RW = world interest rate (proxy US T-
bills) —in percent,
DCPY = domestic credit to the private sec-
tor/GNP —current price in per-
cent,
XKG = rate of growth in export —con-
stant price in percent
SFY = foreign saving/GNP ratio —in
percent,
INF = inflation (growth of consumer
price index) —in percent
MNG = rate of growth in per capita M2
—in percent
The author used the dummy variable
approach (See Gujarati 1995: 512-514) to
find out the effect of the 1983 financial
reform (PAKJUN 1983) and the 1988 of
financial, monetary and banking reform
(PAKTO 1988) toward Indonesian
economy.
The Empirical Evidence
Saving Function
The dummy variable estimation for
saving function is:
SNY = 3.15808  + 63.4056*DUM1
(1.0815) (1.76346)
- 63.5324*DUM2 + 0.3346*YG
(-1.7057) (2.447293)
+ 1.3779*(DUM1*YG)
(0.639468)
- 1.2092*(DUM2*YG) - 0.1040*RD
 (-0.55251) (-1.25339)
+ 0.4717*(DUM1*RD)
(0.78162)
+  0.0907*(DUM2*RD)
(0.127021)
+ 0.7709*SNY(-1)
 (7.860978)
- 2.1967*[DUM1*SNY(-1)]
(-1.56884)
+ 2.0630*[DUM2*SNY(-1)]
(1.446032)
R2 = 0.891349          DW Stat. = 3.077989
The estimation results above show
that there is a significant relationship be-
tween national saving rates, economic
growth rate and national saving in the
previous period. Furthermore, interest rate
variable seems not to have effect on the
rate of national saving. It follows the skep-
tic point of view that there is a small
relationship between interest rates and
national saving. Empirically, insignificant
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relationship between interest rates and
national saving in Indonesia could be
caused by a very long and complex chan-
nel in financial mechanism. So the real
interest rates cannot give, effect to na-
tional saving directly.
From the estimation results, there is a
significant and direct effect of June 1983
financial policy on the rate of national
saving. In order to find out, whether the
change of function happens before or after
the deregulation, the observation is di-
vided into two periods, before and after the
deregulation. Analysis of the role of sav-
ing on economy can also be evaluated
periodically by dividing the analysis pe-
riod into two (before and after PAKJUN
Deregulation 1983).
Before PAKJUN
SNY = 3.1581 + 0.3347*YG  - 0.1040*RD
(1.014) (2.295) (-1.176)
 + 0.7709*SNY(-1)
         (7.372)
R2 = 0.874244       DW Stat. = 3.116240
After PAKJUN
SNY = 11.9195 + 0.2278*YG + 0.4877*RD
(1.426) (0.707) (1.598)
+ 0.4446*SNY(-1)
(1.804)
R2 = 0.514608         DW Stat. = 2.267335
The intermediary function of finan-
cial institutions before the PAKJUN had
not been optimum yet since the real inter-
est rate was always negative. Although
PAKJUN was authorize, still the real in-
terest rate did not affect saving. This cir-
cumstance might become the consequence
that the on going competition among banks
was not on interest rate but more on sup-
plying gift away (presents), improving
services, easy access, and also on manage-
ment improvement. Variable SNY(-1),
before and after deregulation shows a sig-
nificant effect on SNY that public’s ability
to save was determined by the saving in
the previous period.
The CUSUM test result shows the
unchanged parameter estimation of sav-
ing function in both before and after the
deregulation. We can see it in the follow-
ing graph of saving function using a 5
percent degree of significance.
Besides conducting analysis of
PAKJUN deregulation, periodic function
estimation is also conducted to observe the
impact of the deregulation before and after
PAKTO 1988.
Before PAKTO
SNY = 2.6325 + 0.3017*YG - 0.0243*RD
(0.842) (2.015)     (-0.323)
+  0.8449*SNY(-1)
          (9.129)
R2 = 0.842254         DW Stat. =  2.977524
After PAKTO
SNY = 3.0313 + 0.5033*YG + 0.4584*RD
(0.331) (1.372)       (1.304)
+ 0.6373*SNY(-1)
        (2.434)
R2 = 0.751887        DW Stat. =  3.096717
Financial deregulation on October
27, 1988 (PAKTO) had created an easy
access to bank establishments and attract-
ing as many customers as possible. Hav-
ing the policy applied, banks were ex-
pected to generate economic growth by
mobilizing funds and distribute credits for
real sector investment. Though the PAKTO
had flourished bank establishments and
created good competition among them,
competition had no longer on interest rate.
This fact has been proven that empirically
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interest rate did not affect national saving
for both, before and after the applied de-
regulation of PAKTO. Therefore, it also
can be said that the easy requirements of
establishing banks become contra produc-
tive for PAKJUN policy.
CUSUM test before and after PAKTO
shows the changing national saving esti-
mation parameter. Before PAKTO saving
function graph is still at its 5 percent sig-
nificance range but become insignificant
after then
Investment Function
The dummy variable estimation for
investment function is:
IY= 4.739123 + 23.7679*DUM1
(1.575008)     (0.759287)
- 11.3376*DUM2 + 0.0725*YG
       (-0.2724)            (0.669703)
- 0.8333*(DUM1*YG)
         (-0.04745)
+ 1.0899*(DUM2*YG) + 0.5568*RW
             (0.062031)             (1.533462)
- 0.887*(DUM1*RW)
          (-0.03178)
+ 0.376*(DUM2*RW) + 0.725*IY(-1)
         (0.013443)                (4.457154)
- 0.9948*[DUM1*IY(-1)]
            (-0.10913)
+ 0.8272*[DUM2*IY(-1)]
             (0.090507)
+ 0.0746*DCPY
      (0.443795)
+ 0.6269*(DUM1*DCPY)
             (0.047021)
- 0.7774*(DUM2*DCPY)
          (-0.05831)
R2 = 0.951560         DW Stat. = 2.383360
The investment model shows that
there is a significant relationship between
present investments and the previous pe-
riod investment. Economic growth, real
interest rate, and domestic credit variables
do not have significant effect to invest-
ment.
Related to this result, there was in-
elastic investment expenditure toward real
interest rate. To explain this condition, it
needs to consider a fact that there is fewer
interest costs related to total cost of invest-
ment. A lot of economists have been ar-
gued that the roles of interest rate are
limited in influencing investment. The in-
vestment variations particularly come from
long-term interest rates, which mean that
the long-term interest rates indicate short-
term interest rates expectation. It means
that the long-term interest rates alteration
reflect future short-term interest rate alter-
ation.
From investment model above, inter-
cept and slope coefficient are not statisti-
cally significant. It means there are no
effects from both deregulations (PAKJUN
1983 and PAKTO 1988) in investment, in
other word, the model is not stable.
Investment role analysis on the
economy can also be found out periodi-
cally by dividing the period into before
and after deregulation. Please refer to the
following description to see the result of
investment function estimation:
Before PAKJUN
IY = 4.7391 + 0.0725*YG + 0.5568*RW
(1.420)      (0.604)            (1.383)
+ 0.7246*IY(-1) + 0.0746*DCPY
        (4.019)                   (0.400)
R2 = 0.826123         DW Stat. = 2.279857
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After PAKJUN
IY = 21.499 + 0.6662*YG - 1.4234*RW
(3.038)       (4.700)           (-2.886)
+ 0.3680*IY(-1) - 0.0335*DCPY
       (1.800)                 (-0.989)
R2 = 0.886879         DW Stat. = 3.175816
The non-performing role of real in-
terest rate deregulation in affecting invest-
ment was due to the world’s low real
interest rate; even it had been negative
during 1974-1980. On that circumstance,
it means that the debtors enjoyed double
advantages; cheap credit form the state
bank and receiving transfer despite paying
interest rate, because the consideration on
determining credit allocation lied on non-
economic factors rather than economic
ones. The too-low credit interest had stimu-
lated non-optimum usage, e.g. funding
unfeasible investment projects; capital and
foreign currency intensive projects that
created less contribution to economic
growth, employment absorption, and equal
development.
The existence of PAKJUN 1983 has
made the role of real interest rate signifi-
cant. Selective credit policy to optimal the
performance of bank’s credits was being
used to raise production and export by
increasing production capacity. Subsidy
to push interest rate was aimed to stimulate
investment because interest rate was con-
sidered to be an important factor to deter-
mine the rate of public investment expen-
diture.
CUSUM test result before and after
deregulation of June 1, 1983 shows that
investment function remains the same. This
is also shown in the investment function
graph, which is still at its critical line. As
the conclusion, the parameter of invest-
ment function has been stable during the
observation period.
Before PAKTO
IY = 4.1832 + 0.0825*YG + 0.5035*RW
(1.517)       (0.748)           (1.457)
+ 0.7136*IY(-1) + 0.1202*DCPY
       (4.283)                 (0.775)
R2 = 0.875128     DW Stat. = 2.288296
After PAKTO
IY = 17.1694 + 0.3291*YG + 0.0463*RW
 (0.954)       (0.885)          (0.033)
+ 0.5569*IY(-1) - 0.0758*DCPY
      (1.264)                (-1.094)
R2 = 0.637243     DW Stat. = 3.075372
Real interest rate unaffected national
saving for both before and after the PAKTO
deregulation. It also has a significant ef-
fect of the real interest rate to investment.
The establishment of new banks had dis-
torted banking competition in distributing
credits that also related to banks’ limited
ability in issuing credits. Thus, decisions
of issuing credits were not based on accu-
rate analysis. Low interest rate had brought
credits allocation to non-economic con-
siderations, reflected in worst process of
credit selection, monitoring, and credit
recollecting. PAKTO 1988 also emerged
liquidity problem from banking industry
to non-bank financial institution due to
more requirements, such as the health of
source structure and the fund used by
financial institution. Although PAKTO
decreased the minimum reserve require-
ment from 15 percent to only 2 percent,
banks and other financial institutions must
hold it in the form of “Sertifikat Bank
Indonesia (SBI)”. Therefore, the fund
available to distribute was also limited.
The CUSUM tests result before and
after PAKTO shows the unchanged pa-
rameter of investment function. From the
result, we can conclude that the parameter
has been stable during observation period.
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Growth Function
The dummy variable estimation for
growth function is
YG= 6.084484 - 1.2797*DUM1
(3.386839)  (-0.14722)
- 4.1919*DUM2 + 0.1921*RD
     (-0.33564)         (1.279086)
+ 0.0783*(DUM1*RD)
         (0.080071)
+ 0.1793*(DUM2*RD)
           (0.157066)
+ 0.1646*XKG
     (2.658229)
- 0.1426*(DUM1*XKG)
          (-0.67423)
+ 0.4221*(DUM2*XKG)
           (0.532833)
- 0.7449*SFY
    (-2.26085)
+ 1.1728*(DUM1*SFY)
             (0.933441)
+ 0.0121*(DUM2*SFY)
                    (0.007497)
R2 = 0.502135       DW Stat. = 1.774899
From the result of model regression,
t-value (in parenthesis) shows that export
and foreign saving variables significantly
related to economic growth. Meanwhile,
real interest rate does not have effect on
economic growth. Related to economic
growth function, from intercept and slope
coefficient provide evidence that the func-
tion is stable. The existences of financial
reform do not change economic growth
function in long period.
The method used in the previous two
analyses can also be applied in that of
economic growth.
Before PAKJUN
YG= 6.0845 + 0.1921*RD + 0.1646*XKG
(3.045)      (1.150)              (2.390)
- 0.7449*SFY
     (-2.033)
R2 = 0.471109       DW Stat. = 1.671630
After PAKJUN
YG= 2.6901 + 0.4641*RD + 0.0777*XKG
(1.001)       (1.762)             (0.877)
+ 0.1559*SFY
      (0.676)
R2 = 0.315815       DW Stat. = 1.660788
Before PAKJUN the real interest rate
did not affect on economic growth. The
low real interest rate (even negative) and
the non-performing banking intermedia-
tion brought a small amount of fund mobi-
lization from society. Therefore, there was
only a little fund available for investment
in real sector. In a ceiling-based, selective,
and interest subsidy credit system, gov-
ernment directly allocate credit for banks.
Such banking industry repression had cre-
ated burrier to mobilize saving and to
develop national financial system.
After PAKJUN the real interest rates
was determined by the market. The role of
market had become increased in mobiliz-
ing fund and credit allocation. However,
the banking freedom on setting interest
rate was not effective enough to attract
customers. In other words, there was some-
thing more than just the interest rate. In
this research, the role of real interest rate to
national saving is not as it was expected,
that is, the higher interest rate the more
mobile the fund will become, which is
reflected in the higher rate of national
saving. Moreover, the national saving gath-
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ered by banks was due to factors outside
interest rate (excluded in this research).
Theoretically, mobilized fund collected
by banks will be used in funding develop-
ment through credit distributions on real
sector investments. Investment function
estimation result shows that the real inter-
est rate before PAKJUN does not have any
effect on investment expenditure but the
effect began to rise after the PAKJUN.
Through this policy the real interest rate
has its power to stimulate investment ac-
tions and development in real sector. The
result of empirical study on growth model
is also related to this result. Growth func-
tion before deregulation was affected by
real export growth and ratio of foreign
saving to GDP. It makes sense that before
PAKJUN, economic growth was not re-
lated to real interest, that the rate was so
low even negative. As the result, there was
an excessive credit demand allocations to
non-performing investment that contrib-
uted nothing to economic growth. It then
depends on export especially from oil and
gas, also from foreign debt and aid. Both
growth-stimulating factors were consid-
ered to have many weaknesses then. For-
eign currency income from export growth
was not reliable for long term as after the
so-called bonanza era the world’s oil price
had a decreasing trend. Besides, the con-
tinuing foreign debt and aid can only cre-
ate financial burden to the state and its
society in the future. PAKJUN 1983 aimed
to stimulate economic growth by increas-
ing fund mobilization, efficiency on fi-
nancial institution, and economic resources
rationalization. During the implementa-
tion interest rate was set according to mar-
ket mechanism. Indeed, the policy proves
to have a significant effect on economic
growth after the PAKJUN 1983. The mar-
ket-based interest rate is no longer nega-
tive and in return has succeeded in stimu-
lating investment. Higher investment that
had been done would push economic
growth to higher level. Therefore, June
1983 financial deregulation succeeded to
push economic growth through public fund
mobilization.
The CUSUM test before and after
PAKJUN deregulation shows a stable es-
timation function parameter during the
period of observation.
Before PAKTO
YG= 5.8055 + 0.1044*RD + 0.1581*XKG
(3.519)        (0.795)       (2.702)
- 0.6194*SFY
            (-2.002)
R2 = 0.452767           DW Stat. = 1.833385
After PAKTO
YG = 0.6129 + 0.4496*RD + 0.4440*XKG
(0.083)       (0.911)            (0.714)
+ 0.4400*SFY
       (0.511)
R2 = 0.283721      DW Stat. = 1.561269
The role of economic growth on de-
velopment affects the limited available
fund in banking sector to distribute. In-
vestment activities become less expanded
and directly affect economic growth.
The CUSUM test, before and after
PAKTO deregulation, shows stability dur-
ing the period of observation.
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Inflation Function
The dummy variable estimation for
inflation function is:
INF = 3.227153 + 4.3861*DUM1
(1.563947)   (0.380163)
+ 3.3153*DUM2 + 0.3803*MNG
               (0.282365)           (5.759771)
- 0.0096*(DUM1*MNG)
                     (-0.01898)
- 0.4072*(DUM2*MNG)
                         (-0.79263)
- 0.3342*YG + 0.8244*(DUM1*YG)
   (-3.11523)            (0.671839)
- 0.5807*(DUM2*YG)
          (-0.46148)
- 0.732*RD - 0.4266*(DUM1*RD)
 (-12.3096)            (-0.6152)
+ 1.041*(DUM2*RD)
            (1.409345)
R2 = 0.948161          DW Stat. = 1.866982
Along observed period (1969-1997),
the Indonesian inflation was affected by
per capita money supply growth rate, eco-
nomic growth, and real interest rate. How-
ever, the existence of financial deregula-
tion does not give impact to inflation in
Indonesia.
Using the same method, the observa-
tion is divided into two periods, before and
after PAKJUN.
Before PAKJUN
INF= 3.2272 + 0.3803*MNG - 0.3342*YG
(1.279)        (4.710)            (-2.547)
- 0.7319*RD
   (-10.065)
R2 = 0.933887          DW Stat. = 1.689143
After PAKJUN
INF= 11.5332 - 0.0379*MNG + 0.0175*YG
 (7.576)       (-0.661)             (0.110)
- 0.2943*RD
(-2.187)
R2 = 0.408897       DW Stat. = 1.818007
Analysis of inflation on the economy
shows that during 1969-1983, inflation
was caused by the growth of money sup-
ply, economic growth, and real interest
rate. Those factors were related to one
another and created an undivided chain.
Moreover, under employment and blur
economic policy inflation had become so
difficult to control. During that time infla-
tion control policy was conducted by con-
trolling the amount of money supply. The
state’s financial problem after oil boom
was also covered by money printing. Thus,
the exceeding money supply had raised
inflation rate.
Financial deregulation of June 1, 1983
was aimed to increase economic growth
and decrease inflation velocity by letting
the market to meet the desirable interest
rate. Interest rate was expected to be a
good instrument to control inflation rate.
Indeed, this policy brought a favorable
result, at which the rate of inflation suc-
ceeded to absorb money supply from the
public. We can see it from the higher
amount of less-than one-year deposit, clear-
ing account, as well as more-than one-year
deposit. This circumstance reflects
people’s effort to make transaction pay-
ment more efficient to replace higher op-
portunity cost of transaction in cash (inter-
est rate for time deposit). Inflation control
policy can also be applied through mini-
mum reserve requirement, discount facil-
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ity, or open market operation. Those poli-
cies affected inflation growth through in-
terest rates mechanism which no longer
regulated by government after the 1983
PAKJUN deregulation.
Policies to control inflation, how-
ever, have changed the inflation function.
The instable inflation function before
PAKJUN was caused by the uncontrol-
lable inflation growth. After Malari inci-
dent in 1974 there was a cheap credit
policy and inflation was set to be not more
than two digits. Both monetary and fiscal
policies were aimed to control inflation
growth. Therefore, inflation function after
the deregulation became stable.
The CUSUM tests result before and
after the deregulation of June 1 1983 shows
that inflation function parameter has
changed. Before 1983 the inflation func-
tion graph was still at its critical line, but in
the mid 1977, it has gone outside its 5
percent degree of significance.
Before PAKTO
INF= 6.9259 + 0.3032*MNG - 0.3357*YG
(2.969)        (3.697)            (-2.365)
- 0.6568*RD
    (-9.271)
R2 = 0.901911       DW Stat. = 1.572166
After PAKTO
INF= 10.9285 - 0.0365*MNG - 0.0905*YG
 (8.042)        (-0.791)          (-0.670)
- 0.1175*RD
     (-0.993)
R2 = 0.495920       DW Stat. = 2.302706
Before PAKTO deregulation infla-
tion function was determined by the amount
of money supply, economic growth and
real interest rate. Inflation growth during
that period relatively high due to the ab-
sence of inflation control policy. National
income had been increased from oil export
currency during the period of oil boom but
on the other side the expenditure increased
as the consequence of balance budget
policy. However, Indonesian economy,
which still did not meet the full employ-
ment, could not balance between aggre-
gate demand and aggregate supply. This
condition had raised the price rate and than
stimulated cost-push inflation.
In addition, inflation growth was also
affected by the amount of money supply;
in which monetary policy almost always
use this instrument. The undesirable expe-
rience during the oil boom as the result of
government inability to manage its budget
had stimulated inflation and caused the
increase in narrow money (M1). These
raises in turn, directly create budget defi-
cit, which easily can be overcome by print-
ing more money (Hill 1996).
After 1983 the amount of quasi money
exceeded M1. This means, since 1983
deregulation, fund mobilization especially
in deposits had increased, which shows an
improvement in banking sector. To con-
trol the rapid growth of money supply,
government at that time applied tight
money policy to control inflation growth.
In the post 1983 deregulation period,
which let market mechanism to set its
interest rate and PAKTO 1988, which make
bank establishment easier, the amount of
money supply, relatively, tended to have a
rapid rate of growth. Not until economic
crisis started in the mid 1997 causing the
rapid growth of money supply.
Indonesian economic growth that al-
ways followed by rising inflation causes
economic overheating. Therefore, the gov-
ernment must control inflation growth, in
order to avoid economic instability. But
the government has been facing barriers to
control, although monetary authority has
been trying tiding up monetary sector.
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This might happen because monetary poli-
cies are not supported by real sector, which
plays a big role in inflation control (Sabirin
2000).
The CUSUM test before and after the
deregulation of October 27, 1988 shows
that the parameter of inflation function
estimation remains stable.
Conclusions and Policy
Implications
Conclusions
First hypothesis, which stated that
there is a positive relationship between
real interest rate and economic growth,
was rejected. The empirical results show
that both PAKJUN 1983 and PAKTO 1988
do not influence to economic growth. They
cannot become a leading sector in acceler-
ating economic growth. PAKJUN 1983,
which liberate interest rate to follow mar-
ket mechanism, have successfully mobi-
lized capital in the beginning of the period.
Nevertheless, interest rate liberalization
has increased nominal interest rate in both
private and government banks. The em-
pirical findings indicated that real interest
rate in Indonesia, insignificantly influenced
economic growth. It strengthened the sup-
position that in developing countries, fi-
nancial sector tends to grow defeating.
Estimation result from growth model
shows that export growth and foreign sav-
ing for period 1969-1983 caused Indone-
sian economic growth. Furthermore, In-
donesian oil and gas export had contrib-
uted to the government revenue and eco-
nomic growth sustainability. Whereas,
foreign saving also gave contribution to
economic growth in Indonesia, though it
would cause dependency for the country.
Second hypothesis, which stated that
there is a negative relationship between
real interest rate and inflation, was ac-
cepted. Inflation model, which is used in
this research, showed that per capita money
growth, economic growth, and real inter-
est rate influenced inflation in Indonesia
for period 1969-1997. For that period,
inflation relatively under control, but when
oil boom happened, it increased for more
than two digits. The rise in world oil price
gave benefits to Indonesian economy
through the rise in government revenue
from export. Nevertheless, the rise in gov-
ernment revenue causes government ex-
penditure increase (as consequences to
balanced budget policy). The bigger gov-
ernment expenditure, the higher aggre-
gates demand. It caused higher inflation in
oil boom period. For period after deregu-
lation, Indonesian economy more open
and integrated with the world economy.
For that reasons, Indonesian inflation
source not only from domestic, but also
from foreign (external factors, or it called
imported inflation).
For observation 1969-1997 periods,
inflation function had changed structur-
ally, as a result in both deregulation pack-
ages. This empirical result indicated that:
a. Real interest rate did not influence
national saving. For that period, na-
tional saving was influenced by eco-
nomic growth and national saving pre-
vious period. The finding showed that
there was a skeptic for low relationship
between interest rate and national sav-
ing. Theoretically, no relationship be-
tween interest rate and national saving
in Indonesia can be caused by long and
complex path for interest rate to influ-
ence national saving.
b. Correlated with the results above, in-
vestment expenditure was inelastic to
real interest rate. The fact is that the
interest rate cost relatively small than
the investment cost, so that the capital
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owners prefer to save their money in
banks or to buy the fix assets. Actually,
interest rate does not influence the in-
vestment directly. Many economists
stated that the change of interest rate
had a little effect to influence the in-
vestment. Investment variation espe-
cially comes from the change of the
long-term interest rate, which indicates
short-term interest rate expectation in
the future. On the other hand, the change
of long-term interest rate reflects the
change of short-term interest rate in
the future.
Before PAKJUN 1983, real interest
rate did not influence economic growth.
For that period, financial repression policy
had caused nominal interest rate lies under
market interest rate. Because of it, real
interest rate had negative value. Along
that period, economic growth had caused
by real export growth and foreign saving.
Whereas, after PAKJUN 1983 it had caused
only by real interest rate. The reason was
the real interest rate was able to mobilize
fund from people and increased the invest-
ment. The finding indicated that
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis had proved.
It means that the rise in investment would
cause economic growth to increase as well.
Along period 1969-1983, per capita
money growth, economic growth, and real
interest rate caused inflation. McKinnon-
Shaw’s hypothesis was accepted. But, af-
ter 1983 reform, real interest rate played
main role to control inflation. The higher
the real interest rate, the lower the infla-
tion. In other word, there is negative rela-
tionship between real interest rate and
inflation.
Real interest rate towards saving ra-
tio and investment ratio have various ef-
fect according to the periodically func-
tion.
a. Saving function before PAKJUN 1983
had a negative relationship with real
interest rate, but after PAKJUN 1983,
it insignificantly influenced saving
function.
b. Furthermore, investment function had
no relationship with real interest rate
because it was very low. But after
PAKJUN 1983 was applied, real inter-
est rate significantly influenced invest-
ment. This finding indicated that real
interest rate lies on the level, which
could stimulate the investment. This
phenomenon has continued up until
now.
Policy Implications
1. Considering to the successful and fail-
ure of the countries that have carried
out financial reforms, both government
and monetary authorities should care-
fully apply these policies, for the reason
that they are playing the main role as a
monetary and macro economic policy
maker.
2. Both government and monetary authori-
ties should not ‘neurotic’ to establish
the deregulation that they choose. It
means that if a country does not ready
yet to establish financial deregulation,
it should be cancelled until the real
sector adjusts first. Real sector adjust-
ment can be done through allowance,
ease bureaucracy, tax holiday, safe and
conducive regional condition. Further-
more, it needs regulatory framework
about certainty —especially involve
market information, law, and certainty
about rights and duties.
3. The empirical result a negative rela-
tionship between inflation and real in-
terest rate. It suggests that the authority
has consequences establishing inflation
target carefully. The finding implies if
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monetary authority or government will
target the inflation, they have to con-
sider many factors that influence the
inflation, including internal and exter-
nal factors. For example, preparing
domestic supply for goods and services,
which have high weight to inflation and
the import content that influence do-
mestic inflation through the cost of pro-
duction.
4. Performing/pursuing the intermediation
function of the banks that follow mar-
ket mechanism.  Non-pricing competi-
tion should be reduced. This reason was
supported the findings that the fund
from people only could be collected
through gift presented by financial sec-
tors, but they cannot steer into their
fund to the investors who need it. It
could be happen because there is no
stimulus and easiness from financial
sectors to investors who need the fund.
5. To prevent conflicting goals among
monetary authority and fiscal author-
ity, they needs to coordinate better.
They also need to develop beneficial
cooperation to reach macro economic
goals for the country.
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